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II THE COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff and Appellee / 
vs. / 
BILLY PRICE, / Court of Appeals No. 
930605-CA 
Defendant and Appellant / Priority No. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE ABOVE ENTITLED APPEAL IS CONFERRED 
UPON THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS PURSUANT TO U.C.A. §78-2-2(3)(i)( ), 
1953 AS AMENDED. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower court commit error in lailuiHi \mn recognize 
the existence of a conflict when reappointing Attorney Laker and 
appointing Attorney Froerer of the Public Defender Association, of 
Weber County, Inc. to represent the defendant. 
2a Was the representation of counsel, ineffective counsel as 
defined by case law and did such actions effectively constitute a 
violation of defendant/appellant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 
3. Did the failure of the Public Defender Association's 
attorneys to secure or even attempt to secure an investigator in 
2 
this capital homicide case result in a failure to have effective 
counsel present an adequate defense. 
The Standard of Review 
A Sixth Amendment claim grounded upon a conflict of interest 
claim requires the defendant make a showing that a conflict exists 
and actual prejudice need not be demonstrated in such cases while 
ineffective counsel claims are usually a mixed question of law and 
fact which are so basic to a fair trial that its infraction can 
never be treated as harmless error. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION, AND PROVISIONS, 
STATUES AND RULES 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Rule 
1.10 of the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a verdict of guilty of a first degree 
felony, criminal homicide, in the Second Judicial District Court in 
and for Weber County, State of Utah on the 9th day of March, 1993 
heard by a jury with the Honorable Stanton M. Taylor, District Court 
Judge Presiding. 
The defendant was sentenced on April 5, 1993 upon his 
conviction for criminal homicide to a term in the Utah State Prison 
of five (5) years and which may be for life enhanced by an 
additional 0 - 5 years for the use of a firearm in commission of the 
offense, to be served at the Utah State Prison. In addition, after 
the jury returned its verdict, defendant entered a guilty plea to a 
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charge of Possession of a Firearm by Restricted Person, a third 
degree felony, with the Court sentence to run concurrent with the 
sentence for criminal homicide. 
On May 3, 1993, the defendant, through Stephen A. Laker of the 
Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber County, filed a Notice of 
Appeal of all convictions wherein notice was filed with the Clerk of 
the Court of the Second Judicial District Court in and for the 
County of Weber, State of Utah. 
The appeal was originally docketed in the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah, but the Utah Supreme Court assigned same to the Court 
of Appeals by letter dated September 21, 1993. 
Attorney Laker of the Public Defender Association of Weber 
County, Inc. filed a brief on behalf of the defendant on November 3, 
1993. 
Two days later, on November 5, 1993, the defendant/appellant 
filed a pro se motion requesting substitute counsel due to conflict 
of interest and ineffective counsel. 
After Attorney Laker filed a motion to withdraw, this 
proceeding was remanded to the Second District Court whereat 
Attorney Laker was permitted to withdraw and private counsel, as 
opposed to a member of the Public Defender Association of Weber 
County, Inc., was appointed to assert defendant' s claims of conflict 
of interest and ineffective counsel. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendant, Billy J. Price was initially represented by Earl 
Xais, a private attorney, who was hired by the defendant and in 
fact, conducted the preliminary examination on behalf of the 
defendant although Mr. Allen of the Public Defender Association was 
initially assigned to conduct defendant's preliminary hearing. 
By virtue of defendant becoming non-bailable due to the State 
amending the information to an aggravated murder, a capital offense, 
the defendant appeared before the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde for 
arraignment on April 30, 1992 and entered pleas of not guilty to the 
two count information. 
Appearing with the defendant at such hearing, was Attorney 
Stephen Laker, of the Public Defender Association, Inc. of Weber 
County who indicated in discussion with the court that he and 
Attorney Martin Gravis were co-counsel in this proceeding. ( TR. 
April 30, 1992 Pg. 3) 
The defendant1 s attorney Martin Gravis, who was also the 
Managing Associate of the Public Defender Association, Inc., 
subsequently filed a motion requesting the court proceed in camera 
with regard to defendant' s application for expert and investigative 
assistance. ( R.30-34 ) 
The State of Utah, prior to the hearing requesting such 
assistance, filed an objection and cited the agreement between Weber 
County and the Public Defender Association which provided that 
attorneys hired by the Association did their own reasonable 
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investigating but could with prior approval of the County secure 
such payment by the county. (R.69-70). Defendant's motion came on 
for hearing on May 22, 1992 and on the issue of investigative 
services the following colloquy occurred: 
MR. GRAVIS: Investigatory Services. Unless the — 
it's extraordinary and the contract provides we go that 
the — it wasn't well thought out, it provides that the — 
if I need extra investigatory services, I go to my board 
of directors, and then if they approve. We come to the 
court and to the county commission. I feel after looking 
at that, if there is extraordinary investigatory services, 
that is not a proper way to do it, allowing the county to 
say whether or not— 
THE COURT: I don't think it's whether or not you do 
it, it's whether or not the pay you the extra for it. 
MR. GRAVIS: But I don't anticipate that's going to 
be a necessity in this case, but we can argue about it, 
but I don't anticipate that we're going to be asking for 
extra money for investigatory services so— 
THE COURT: Well then I guess you don't have a 
problem, do you? 
MR. GRAVIS: If that does, then we can argue about it 
later,... (TR. May 22, 1992, Pg. 10). 
Thereafter, on or about July 28, 1992, Attorney Gravis and 
Attorney Laker ceased representing the defendant when a conflict 
developed between themf and on August 3, 1992, Attorney John Caine 
appeared with the defendant and stated to the court as follows: 
As your honor is aware, this is Mr. Price here beside 
me. Because of a conflict that arose with other members of 
the Public Defender staff, he has asked that I get in this 
case. (TR. August 3, 1992, Pg. 2) 
After further explanation by Attorney Caine of him having a 
relationship with some of the victim' s family, which had been over 
many years of representing a number of them, and his continued 
association with some members of the victim' s family, the following 
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colloquy with the court was held: 
THE COURT: If you feel that relationship would in 
any way affect your representation of Mr. Price, that's 
the question. 
MR. CAINE: Believe me, I've been thinking about that 
for some time - - some time. It's hard - - it's hard to 
answer that. I've reviewed the facts of this case and I 
think I'm fairly conversant with what is alleged to have 
happened here and feel strongly about some aspects of it, 
and you'll see that as we go through. 
But I do have - - I have been friends with various members 
of the victim's family and I've also represented them and 
still consider myself to be friends with some of them. I 
know they're not going to be very happy about me being 
involved in this case, but don't think they get to pick 
either, so I'll continue to assess that. Right at the 
moment I do not think it would impact anything that I 
would do here. That is my view. 
THE COURT: Alright. 
MR. CAINE: And I have been over this extensively 
with Billy; is that right. 
MR. PRICE: Sure. 
MR. CAINE: And you and I have talked about this. 
THE COURT: How do you feel about it Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: I want him to be pretty professional 
about it for me to put my confidence in him. 
THE COURT: Do you want him to continue as your 
attorney, knowing what you know about this situation? 
MR. PRICE: If it is not going to cause any kind of 
a conflict of interest, sure. (TR. August 3, 1992 Pg. 3-
On November 9, 1992, when a final Pre-trial hearing was 
scheduled, Attorney Caine indicated problems had arisen in his 
continued representation of the defendant. (TR. November 9, 1992 pg 
2-5) 
After which, the following discussion took place between the 
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court and the defendant: 
MR. PRICE: Then give me an attorney out of this 
county where I don't have to fear them being so close to 
Mr. Caine and Ms. Knowlton. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you say this three or four 
months ago Mr. Price? 
MR. PRICE: Because I wanted to give this man a fair 
chance. I mean if - - if he's an attorney and if he wants 
t© do the right thing then I won't stop that, and I won't 
prolong the court, like I said. But if he's not, who's to 
say what he is going to let this lady get away with. (TR. 
November 9, 1992 Pg. 12) 
The defendant reiterated at such hearing that he wanted 
somebody out of this county who would not be subject to influences 
with these people. (TR. November 9, 1992 Pg. 18) 
In light of what was transpiring, Attorney Gravis, the Managing 
Associate of the Weber County Public Defender Association, Inc. and 
prior attorney for the defendant in this proceeding became involved 
in the discussion with the court. Attorney Gravis had previously 
withdrawn as defendant' s attorney by virtue of a conflict with the 
defendant and himself. After the discussion between the Court and 
Attorney Gravis the issue of who would be representing the defendant 
was scheduled for further hearing on November 16, 1992. ( TR. 
November 9, 1992 Pg 27-34 ). 
During such hearing on November 9, 1992, the defendant had 
indicated to the Court in light of what had occurred he did not feel 
comfortable with " any of them up here" referring to the Public 
Defender Association of Weber County representing him. 
After the defendant made such statement to the Court, Attorney 
Gravis requested to address the Court concerning the issue of who 
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would be representing the defendant and advised the court when he 
was acting as prior counsel for Mr. Price, he was told by Mr. Price 
that he was going to keep firing public defenders until the court 
appointed Ron Yengich to represent him. The only issue Attorney 
Gravis was disposed to address to the Court at that time was the 
issue of public defender money. ( Tr. November 9, 1995 Pg. 27-28) 
At the hearing of November 16, 1992, Attorney Gravis appeared 
and indicated that the only other three individuals within the 
Public Defender Association that could be considered, were Attorneys 
Allen, Laker and Froerer. (TR. November 16, 1992 Pg. 3 - 5 ) 
The court, after some discussion, indicated that it would not 
be appropriate for Attorney Allen to represent the defendant since 
he was a partner with Mr. Caine. (November 16, 1992 TR. Pg. 5) 
Despite the court being informed that Attorney Laker had previously 
been involved as co-counsel with Attorney Gravis and having 
previously withdrawn when Attorney Caine assumed the representation 
of the defendant ( TR. November 16, 1994 Pg. 6), the court advised 
the defendant he would be having attorneys Froerer and Laker sit 
down with him relative to their representation of him. (TR. November 
16, 1992 Pg. 8) 
The defendant, when asked what he thought about the situation 
indicated to the court as follows: 
MR. PRICE: I still feel the same way I did last week 
about them sticking together though I mean 
THE COURT: I am ruling as a matter of law that these 
attorneys are not in anybody's pockets. 
MR. PRICE: I am not saying they are in anybody's 
pockets, but they are sure sticking together quite a bit. 
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THE COURTS Well, the trouble Mr. Price, is that if 
the Public Defender believes that the law is a particular 
way and the County Attorney's Office also believes that 
the law is a particular way that doesn't mean that they 
are sticking together. What that may mean is that that's 
what the law is and if that is your concern, that is a 
valid concern from the standpoint of this case. 
MR. PRICEs I would much rather be comfortable with 
counsel outside of the county. 
THE COURT: No sir, that is not - - you1 re not 
entitled as a matter of law to that. 
MR. PRICE: I understand. (TR. Nov. 16, 1992 Pg.9 ) 
At the final hearing relating to appointment of counsel on 
November 19, 1992, the court appointed attorneys Laker and Froerer 
to represent the defendant, and again asked Mr. Price if he wished 
to be heard and the defendant stated as follows: 
MR. PRICE: I don't want to aggravate you or upset 
you or anything like that, but I still feel.. 
THE COURT: It's okay, I have already got a headache, 
so it's alright. 
MR. PRICE: I just want the court .. 
THE COURT: Say what you feel Mr. Price. 
MR. PRICE: I just want some experience. I mean I am 
sure Mr. Laker I told him he's a pretty good person, but 
for a case like this you have to have the experience. 
( TR. November 19, 1992 Pg. 8) 
During the same discussion between the court and the defendant, 
the following discourse also occurred: 
THE COURT: Okay, let's set it for trial. 
MR. PRICE: It's still going to cause a conflict of 
interest, and that is what I'm scared of right now. 
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THE COURT: Well now if the conflict of interest your 
concerned about is the relationship between the County 
Attorney's Office and the Public Defender's office, I am 
finding specifically that there is not a conflict of 
interest. 
Now, is there some other conflict of interest you are 
concerned about? 
MR. PRICE: There is a problem there. I mean, your 
the Judge, I can see it, surely you can see it. (November 
19. 1992 TR. Pg.9-10 ) 
After jury selection, the trial proceeded on March 4, 5, 8, and 
9, 1993. At such trial, the State called as witnesses seven (7) 
police officers including dispatcher Mitchell; a criminalist; a 
medical examiner; three (3) witnesses to the shooting death of 
Kathryn Scott (Hairston, De Lavallade, and Kunua);and two (2) 
relatives of the decedent (Ross and Anderson). 
Mr. De Lavallade, who was a neighbor of the decedent, testified 
that while not seeing the shooting he saw a black male standing over 
the body shouting and hollering all kinds of obscenities (Tr. Vol.7. 
Pg. 120) 
Jesse Anderson, the decedent' s grandmother, testified the 
defendant sounded angry earlier the night of the shooting when he 
was trying to contact her relative to visitation with his daughter 
(Tr. Vol.8 Pg. 70 ). She also testified the defendant was sneaky, 
although she didn* t see him much because she wasn' t around him much. 
Additionally, she testified she had a conversation with him on 
one occasion where the defendant asked her to hit him because he had 
done something wrong to the decedent, Kathryn Scott, and despite the 
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decedent' s request that Mrs. Anderson hit him, she wouldn1 t hit the 
defendant. (Tr. Vol. 8 Pg 72, 74 ). 
Contrarily, the Defense called no witnesses and the entire 
defense portion of the case consisted of playing the 911 emergency 
tape, which had been discussed by police dispatcher Mitchell during 
the State1 s presentation of its case. 
After conviction and sentence, at the request of the defendant, 
Attorney Laker on behalf of the Public Defender Association,Inc. 
filed a Notice of Appeal and submitted a brief on behalf of the 
defendant. Said brief was filed with the court on or about November 
3, 1993. 
The defendant, on or about November 5, 1993, filed a pro se 
motion for appointment of substitute counsel citing conflict of 
interest and ineffective counsel and in response thereto defendants 
counsel, Stephen A. Laker on December 13, 1993, filed a Notice of 
Withdraw. 
This matter was returned to the Second District Court for 
consideration of the defendant's motion for appointment of 
substitute counsel and Attorney Laker1 s Motion to Withdraw, which 
resulted in the appointment of private counsel unaffiliated with the 
Public Defender Association of Weber County, Inc. to assert 
defendant' s claims of conflict of interest and ineffective counsel. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant, Billy J. Price, asserts that he was denied 
effective counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment constitutional 
rights. Such conflict of interest was raised and pronounced many 
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times to the District Court by the defendant and such conflict was 
of such a nature, that prejudice is presumed. 
In the event this court determines that a conflict of interest 
does exist but prejudice is not presumed or that the conflict of 
interest was not properly raised by the defendant at the trial 
level, then the defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial in that 
he was compelled to accept as counsel individuals who acted in 
concert and not in his best interest. 
Defendant also asserts the Public Defender Association was more 
concerned with Public Defender money than in defendant being 
afforded a proper and complete defense as evidenced by the failure 
of any of the five (5) Public Defender Association members to even 
request an investigator be appointed at county expense. 
Such monetary concern, as opposed to the zealous representation 
of an attorney1 s client is also evidenced by the actions of Attorney 
Martin Gravis, Managing Associate of the Public Defender 
Association, who divulged statements made in confidence to him by 
the defendant while he was representing the defendant, when it 
appeared the Court may appoint someone other than a member of the 
local Public Defender Association to represent the defendant. (Tr. 
November 9, 1995 Pg 27-28) 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DID THE LOWER COURT' S FAILURE TO PERCEIVE THE 
CONFLICT OF INTEREST WHEN APPOINTING ATTORNEYS LAKER AND 
FROERER RESULT IN A DENIAL OF DEFENDANT RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 
13 
(Utah App. 1991) reiterated the importance of a defendant being 
afforded a fair trial by having the effective assistance of counsel 
and stated: 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states: In all criminal prosecutions the defendant shall 
enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for 
his defense. This right guarantees all criminal 
defendants the right to effective counsel, Tempiin, 805 
P.2d at 186, and S6 includes the right to counsel, free from 
conflict of interest" State v. Webb, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 
S.Ct at 2065). State v. Johnson, 823 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 
1991) 
State v. Johnson, cited supra, also addressed the issue of 
conflict of interest and its being a special subtype of an 
ineffectiveness claim and held where a defendant prevails in his 
showing that an actual conflict of interest existed which adversely 
affected his lawyer1 s performance, prejudice will be presumed by the 
court. 
Pursuant to Rule 1.10 Imputed Disqualification: General Rule. 
of the Rules of Professional Conduct there appears a definition of 
"firm": 
For purposes of the Rules of Professional Conduct, 
the term "firm" includes lawyers in a private firm and 
lawyers employed in the legal department of a corporation 
or other organization or in a legal services organization. 
Whether two or more lawyers constitute a firm within this 
definition can depend on the specific facts. For example, 
two practitioners who share office space and occasionally 
consult or assist each other ordinarily would not be 
regarded as constituting a firm. However, if they present 
themselves to the public in a way suggesting that they are 
a firm or conduct themselves as a firm, they should be 
regarded as a firm for purposes of the Rules. 
The defendant asserts that the Public Defender Association, 
Inc., of Weber County, is a firm as defined by the rules and as such 
the imputed disqualification should apply in this case. 
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The Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Johnson, cited supra, in 
addressing the prior Canon Nine of the former Canons of Professional 
Responsibility held as follows: 
First, the court must find that there is "at least a 
reasonable possibility that some specifically identifiable 
impropriety" occurred because of the representation. Id. 
(quoting Woods v. Covington County Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 813 
(5th Cir. 1976) There need not be proof of actual 
wrongdoing, however. Id. at 829. Second, the court must 
balance "the likelihood of public suspicion or obloquy" 
against the social interest in allowing the defendant to 
continue being represented by the lawyer of his or her 
choice. Hobspn, 673 F.2d at 828 (quoting Woods, 537 F.2d 
at 813 n. 12). 
The defendant conceded to the trial court he didn' t have the 
right to select private counsel but asked the court to appoint an 
attorney from another county only after the inherent, if not 
outwardly visible, conflicts of interest developed. 
Not only was the Public Defender Association, Inc. Of Weber 
County an association or "firm" consisting of only five (5) members 
(Attorneys' Gravis, Laker, Caine, Allen, and Froerer), one of the 
members, Attorney Caine, had a special and ongoing relationship with 
a number of the decedent* s relatives which ultimately resulted in 
Attorney Caine' s inability to represent the defendant. 
After such disqualification arose,in light of the other 
conflicts that had previously arisen between other members of the 
Public Defender Association and the defendant, the court should have 
been aware of the conflict and appointed non-affiliated counsel. 
The court as well as the Public Defender Association should 
have been cognizant of the inherent hesitation of the defendant to 
fully confide in members of the Public Defender Association where 
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one of their members had an ongoing relationship with the victim' s 
family members and then further compounded the problem by 
reappointing Attorney Laker, who was previously co-counsel with 
Attorney Gravis, to represent the defendant 
The Court, in State v. Johnson, cited supra, declared the right 
to effective assistance of counsel is so basic to a fair trial that 
its infraction can never be treated as harmless error and that a 
Sixth Amendment claim grounded on conflict of interest is a special 
type of ineffectiveness claim and must be analyzed under a standard 
different from that used for other ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims: 
A defendant who did not object to the conflict at 
trial, has the burden on appeal of demonstrating with 
specificity that "an actual conflict of interest existed 
when adversely affected his [or her] lawyer' s performance. 
Webb, 790 P.2d at 73( quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 
335, 348, 100 S.Ctc 1708, 1718 (1980); Zepp, 748 F.2d at 
135-36,( citing Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 
S.Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981)). If the defendant makes such a 
showing, prejudice need not be demonstrated to prevail on 
the claim. Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 349-50 100 S.Ct. at 1718-
19; Webb, 790 P.2d at 73. The court will presume the 
defendant was prejudiced by the lawyer's performance. 
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658, 104 S.Ct. 
2039, 2046, (1984); Webb, 790 P.2d at 73 (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692, 104 S.Ct. at 2067) 
In the instant proceeding, the defendant did object claiming a 
conflict of interest on numerous occasions to the court and the 
following discourse on November 9, 1992 fortifies defendant's 
conflict claim: 
MR. PRICE: I don't feel comfortable with any of them 
up here though, I honestly don't. 
THE COURT: You don't get to choose your attorney. 
MR. PRICE: I understand I don't, but - -
16 
THE COURT: And you don't even know who we are 
talking about, yet your not comfortable with them. 
MR. GRAVIS: Your honor, may I address the court? 
THE COURT: Yes you may. 
MR. GRAVIS As you know, I was prior counsel for Mr. 
Price. I do have some concerns about this. Mr. Price has 
Indicated to me In the past that he was going to keep 
firing Public Defenders and he thought that he could get 
the court to appoint Ron Yenglch to represent him. 
THE COURT: He's not going to get the appointment of 
anybody. 
MR. GRAVIS: And as managing attorney of the Public 
Defender's office, as I say, we don't have a contract with 
anybody else and I do have some concerns if he, again, 
moves to fire any Public Defender. At that point, we 
don't have anybody left to represent him. 
MR. PRICE: See, this is what I'm talking about. I 
don't mean - -
THE COURT: That's what he is talking about too, Mr. 
Price. 
MR. PRICE: See, I don't need that influence. Now, 
all of these people sir, are good friends. They have been 
working together for years and I am sure that they have 
handled many cases. 
MR. GRAVIS: That is my concern as managing attorney, 
that if we get an attorney outside the Public Defender's 
office, public defenders does not have the money to obtain 
private counsel for Mr. Price. 
THE COURT: Well of course I guess that is a public 
expense and if we have . • 
MR. GRAVIS: Well that's not necessary so, the only 
way. 
THE COURT: I understand. 
MR. GRAVIS: There would have to be hearing and in 
order for the county....( November 9, 1992. TR. Pg. 27 -
28) 
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This discourse between the court, Attorney Gravis as Managing 
Associate of the Public Defender Association of Weber County and 
prior attorney for the defendant illustrates the defendant* s 
concern about members of the Public Defender Association 
representing him when it is apparent that the interest of the Public 
Defender Association is monetary and has nothing to do with 
defendant being effectively represented, 
II. 
THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION ATTORNEYS FAILED TO 
PROVIDE DEFENDANT WITH UNDIVIDED LOYALTY AND AN EFFECTIVE 
DEFENSE RESULTING IN A DENIAL OF HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
AND RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Defendant asserts as the Utah Supreme Court held in State v> 
Brown, 853 P.2d 851 (Utah, 1992) this is the same type of inherent 
conflict of interest which requires reversal for the defendant's 
right to the undivided loyalty of counsel was jeopardized by the 
actions of one of the members the Public Defender Association. 
The conduct of Attorney Gravis, of the Public Defender 
Association, in divulging confidential statements made to him by the 
defendant when monetary considerations became an issue, constituted 
a violation of the attorney-client privilege and created a situation 
breeding individual as well as public mistrust and the per se rule 
of reversal should apply when a conflict of interest manifests 
itself so blatantly. 
In State v. Brown, cited supra, the Utah Supreme Court was very 
mindful of public confidence in the criminal justice system and 
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insuring the public' s faith in the impartiality and integrity of the 
justice system and the appearance of fairness and impartiality in 
the adjudication process must be diligently maintained. 
The Supreme Court in State v. Brown also stressed the 
importance of undivided loyalty due an indigent defendant and 
recognized the difficulties in determining what sort of unconscious 
influences may affect such advocacy. Certainly, the monetary 
concerns of the Public Defender Association of Weber County taking 
priority over zealous representation of the defendant resulting in 
a violation of the attorney-client privilege and ignoring any 
consideration of conflict of interest is indicative of the lack of 
the undivided loyalty due but not afforded this defendant. T h e 
Public Defender Association, Inc. either through oversight, 
budgetary constraints or because of the numerous changes of 
attorneys assigned to this proceeding ignored the need for an 
investigator which the defendant needed in preparing and presenting 
a full and unfettered defense, especially since he was incarcerated 
awaiting trial and could not seek out witnesses or facts in his own 
defense. 
Attorneys Laker and Froerer, who conducted the actual trial 
defense of the defendant, were members of the same Association as 
Attorneys Caine and Gravis and not one of them sought or perceived 
the need for making request of the county for costs in hiring an 
investigator, despite a central issue in this capital homicide 
proceeding being prior conduct between the decedent and the 
defendant. In fact, a prior assaultive incident involving the 
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decedent and the defendant was testified to and received by the 
court (TR. Vol, 8 Pg.59-61 ). 
The defendant, whose entire defense presentation consisted of 
playing the 911 emergency recording to the jury (TR. Vol.9 Pg.8-9) 
was incarcerated awaiting trial and unable to seek out any witnesses 
to his relationship with the decedent and his theory of the case. 
The defendant' s attorneys advanced the proposition in their 
opening statement that there was a great deal of animosity between 
the decedent' s family and the defendant, even instances where the 
defendant had been threatened by them. There was also discussion in 
defendant' s opening statement of defendant' s anger and frustration 
in his relationship with the decedent.(TR. Vol 7. Pg 61-71 ) 
The prosecution requested the court address the issue of the 
State presenting to the jury, facts surrounding such relationship 
after such opening statement and the court inquired of defense 
counsel if they were going to present evidence concerning such 
issue. Attorneys Laker and Froerer indicated to the court that the 
defense was hoping to present evidence on such matter to the jury 
but didn't know if they could. (Tr.Vol.8 Pg 4-5) 
Without securing witnesses or presenting testimony to establish 
the mental state of the defendant from such prior relationship of 
the defendant to the decedent, there was Tittle, if any, evidence 
available for the jury to consider the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter, based upon a showing of "extreme emotional disturbance 
for which there is a reasonable explanation or excuse". The failure 
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of defendant' s counsel leads directly to the conclusion that the 
claim of defendant that he was not effectively represented is well 
founded. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing arguments the defendant, 
BILLY JOE PRICE ,requests this court grant defendant a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /o day of April, 1995. 
DONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to State of Utah, Office of Attorney General, 
THOMAS B. BRUNKER, 236 State Capitol, Salt lake City, Utah 84111 on 
this I / day of April, 1995. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
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AGREEMENT FOR INDIGENT 
CRIMINAL LEGAL SERVICES 
THIS AGREEMENT dated as of the _J day of ^ 0 ^ r i/j
 f 
1990, entered into by and between WEBER COUNTY CORPORATION, Utah 
(the "County"), a political subdivision and body politic under the 
laws of the State of Utah, and THE PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION OF 
WEBER COUNTY> INC. (the "Association"), a non-profit corporation 
duly organized, existing and in good standing under the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
W I T N E S S E T H : 
WHEREAS, the COUNTY, pursuant to Chapter 32 of Title 77, 
Utah Code Annotated, is required to furnish legal defense for 
indigent persons charged in Weber County in criminal cases in the 
courts and various administrative bodies of the State of Utah; and 
WHEREAS, the ASSOCIATION is a non-profit corporation duly 
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah for the 
purpose of providing legal services in criminal cases to indigent 
persons pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 77-32~6(a); and 
WHEREAS, the COUNTY and ASSOCIATION are mutually desirous 
to enter into an agreement to provide criminal legal services to 
indigent persons; 
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual 
promises and covenants herein contained, the parties hereto agree 
as follows: 
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Section I 
Term 
A. Commencement. This contract shall commence on 
January 1, 1990. The original term of the contract shall be four 
years. After the original term, this contract shall continue on a 
continuing four year term basis unless canceled by either the 
COUNTY or the ASSOCIATION prior to the beginning of any four year 
term. 
B. Termination of the Agreement. This Agreement may be 
canceled by either party after the original term by sending written 
notice of cancellation to the other party at least three months 
prior to the end of the calendar year. 
Section II 
Payment 
The COUNTY agrees to pay the ASSOCIATION for legal and 
investigative services as follows: 
A. Amount. A base amount of $164,000 for the calendar 
year of 1990. Each year thereafter, any adjustment shall be made 
according to the average percentage increase granted to merit 
employees of the COUNTY. The average percentage increase in the 
salaries of the merit employees of the COUNTY shall be similarly 
added to the base amount of this contract. The base amount will be 
adjusted annually during the COUNTY'S budget process. The first 
adjustment shall be included in the 1991 COUNTY budget, adding to 
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the base all appropriate increases granted to COUNTY merit 
employees during the 1990 calendar year. If the criminal cases 
filed by the COUNTY increases twenty percent (20%) or more over the 
County Attorney's case load in 1989, the parties shall renegotiate 
the base amount of the contract. 
B. Payment Schedule. Payments from the COUNTY to the 
ASSOCIATION shall be made in twelve (12) equal installments paid 
the first of each month. 
C. Additional Compensation - Appeals. The ASSOCIATION 
shall be responsible to file, brief and argue, if required, without 
additional compensation the first fifteen (15) appeals before any 
appropriate state court during any calendar year. The ASSOCIATION 
shall be paid at a rate of $500 for each additional appeal above 
fifteen (15) filed in any calendar year as required in Section 
III. A. below. To receive compensation, an appeal brief must be 
filed with the Utah Court of Appeals or the Utah Supreme Court. 
Mere notice of appeal without further action will not qualify for 
additional compensation. Any federal appellate court appearance 
required to be made by the ASSOCIATION shall require additional 
compensation, which shall be negotiated by the parties. 
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Section III 
Services Provided by the ASSOCIATION 
A. Legal Services. The ASSOCIATION shall provide 
qualified legal counsel. All attorneys providing services shall be 
members of the Utah State Bar in good standing. 
The ASSOCIATION shall provide legal counsel for any 
indigent adult eighteen (18) years or older, or any juvenile 
certified by the Juvenile Court to stand trial as an adult, or any 
juvenile who is charged as an adult with a criminal offense by the 
State of Utah in Weber County. Such representation shall be as 
required by Chapter 32 of Title 77 of Utah Code Annotated or any 
successor statute or court decision regarding indigent criminal 
defense. 
The ASSOCIATION shall also be responsible annually 
for all indigent criminal appeals, criminal writs, and other 
criminal proceedings for which the COUNTY is responsible for 
providing defense pursuant to Chapter 32, Title 77, or other 
provisions of the law brought before the courts of the State of 
Utah or courts of the United States and originating in Weber 
County. 
B. Staff. The ASSOCIATION shall provide an adequate 
number of attorneys to act as defense counsel. 
The attorneys hired by the ASSOCIATION shall do 
their own reasonable investigating. The ASSOCIATION shall provide 
other facilities (secretarial staff) as necessary to provide 
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support for the attorneys. Cost of all hired investigators (with 
prior approval by the Chairman of the ASSOCIATION, the County 
Commission member of the ASSOCIATION, and the appropriate court) 
shall be paid by the COUNTY. 
C. Other Expenses. The ASSOCIATION shall be solely 
responsible for all office expenses relating to the ASSOCIATION. 
Section IV 
Location of ASSOCIATION 
The ASSOCIATION shall maintain an office to conduct their 
business. The current location is 2568 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah 84401. The ASSOCIATION shall notify the COUNTY in 
writing of any change of address at least two (2) weeks before any 
move. 
Section V 
Independent Contractor Status 
The ASSOCIATION is an independent contractor with the 
COUNTY. The ASSOCIATION shall be solely responsible for all 
appropriate social security, workman's compensation, and pension 
plans as required by law. It is understood and agreed that none of 
the individuals hired or contracted by the ASSOCIATION are 
employees of the COUNTY. 
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Section VI 
Conflicts of Interest 
The ASSOCIATION and the COUNTY recognize that in previous 
years problems have arisen in the area of conflicts of interest. 
To help alleviate the problems, the ASSOCIATION shall contract with 
at least three law firms and/or individual practitioners not 
associated in fact. The ASSOCIATION shall continue to use its best 
efforts to maintain a staff of independent attorneys who are 
independent from each other. 
The appointment of counsel outside the ASSOCIATION shall 
only occur when the court determines that all the attorneys 
contracted with the ASSOCIATION have a conflict of interest with a 
defendant. 
Upon a ruling by the court that all the attorneys 
contracted with the ASSOCIATION have a conflict of interest in 
representation of a particular defendant, the COUNTY shall be 
responsible to contract with outside legal counsel for a defendant. 
The ASSOCIATION shall not be liable for any legal costs of 
defending such an individual. 
Section VII 
Qualification for Indigent Representation 
A. Affidavit of Impecuniosity. The ASSOCIATION'S 
attorneys shall interview any defendant requesting a public 
defender to determine if the individual qualifies. If the 
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individual qualifies, the attorney shall prepare an affidavit 
listing all assets and income of the individual. The affidavit's 
form shall be approved by the County Attorney, the Judges of Weber 
County, and the ASSOCIATION. The ASSOCIATION shall notify the 
appropriate court when an individual who has previously qualified 
for indigent legal counsel is no longer eligible for those 
services. 
B. Private Criminal Clients. The attorneys contracting 
with the ASSOCIATION shall not be prohibited from maintaining a 
private criminal practice. The ASSOCIATION'S attorneys shall not 
represent, in the referred criminal case, individuals referred to 
the attorney for screening regarding indigency qualifications who 
subsequently do not qualify for such representation. This shall 
not prohibit another attorney contracted by the ASSOCIATION from 
being retained by a non-qualifying individual as long as there is 
no referral from any other attorney in the ASSOCIATION, and the 
contact is made independent from any ASSOCIATION referral. 
C. Referrals of Non-Qualifying Individuals. A referral 
service shall be established by the ASSOCIATION'S contracted 
attorneys. The contracted attorneys shall provide to a non-
qualifying individual a list of other private legal counsel. No 
attorney contracting with the ASSOCIATION shall be placed on the 
list. Any qualified attorney who requests shall be placed on the 
ASSOCIATION'S referral list. 
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D. Recoupment of Attorney Fees. The ASSOo FAr: : * M, 
through its attorneys and the County Attorney, sh « " "i ^ *.,;*., r 
to urge the courts to adoi t ,i <o>«,!« \i * imposing aLtorne1-"^ : e<- ; • :• 
c»"»viv U *t f >i 1 iii C hdniits pinsnaril. I n oeeiion ?/~32a~2, w^cm tuue 
Annotated . 
Section VTTT 
County Commission Membership on ihe ASSOC;-
The Boanl of County Ci mum i *•,«• i in n -rs . ... . . d^sjoiMtc- • i 
writing the ASSOC LAT I uri one ot" i i s . eir.b^ -rs * > ;-^ i 
representative on the Board of Trustees of t;h • •• 
Commissioners' representative sha i n i ,artieipat r.j 
trustee. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto H-IVP PV *><:W\ .•. I 1 I. i,:; 
Agreement the day and year firs wo v»i it. Inn, 
WEBER COUNTY CORPORATION" 
By: C^y^SJoArtJ$x 
William A. Bailey, Chair 
THE WEBER COUNTY PUBLIC 
DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, INC. 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT I 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, 
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances, 
AMENDMENT II 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and hear Anns shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
No Soldier shall, in tune of peace be quartered in an) Iioiibo, without 
the consent of the Owner, nor in tune of war, but in a manner to be 
prescribed by law 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb ; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation 
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CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES AMEND. XII 
AMENDMEN1 
In ail criminal prosecutions., the accused snail enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and 
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defence. 
AMENDMENT 
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact 
tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the 
United States, than according to the rules of the common law. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 
AMENDMENT IX 
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people, 
AMENDMENT X 
The powers not del ^ tia ted u. * ].e United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to tin- States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people. 
The first ten Amendments were proposed by the first Congress and were ratified 
as follows: New Jersey, Nov. 20, 1789; Maryland, Dee. 19, 1789; North Carolina, 
Dee. 22, 1789; South Carolina, Jan. 19, 1790; New Hampshire, Jan. 25, 1790; Delaware, 
Jan. 28, 1790; Pennsylvania, Mar. 10, 1790; New York, March 27, 1790; Rhode Island, 
June 15, 1790; Vermont, Nov. 3, 1791 j Virginia, Dec. 15, 1791. Connecticut, Georgia 
and Massachusetts ratified them on April 19, 1939, March 18, 1939 and March 2, 1939, 
respectively. 
AMENDMENT XI 
The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to ex-
tend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Sub-
jects of any Foreign State. 
History: Proposed by Congress on Sep- lied by the legislatures of three-fourths 
tember 5, 1794; declared to have been rati- of all the states on January 8, 1798. 
AMENDMENT XII 
The Electors shall meet in their respective states, and vote by "ballot 
for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall, not be an 
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inhabitant of the same state with themselves: they shall name in their 
ballots the person voted i."or as President, and in distinct ballots the per-
son voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all 
persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-
President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall 
sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the Government of 
the United States directed to the President of the Senate;—The Presi-
dent of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of 
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be 
counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for Presi-
dent, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole 
number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, 
then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three 
on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives 
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the 
President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from 
each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of 
a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority 
of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of 
Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice 
shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, 
then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the 
death or other constitutional disability of the President.—The person 
having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-
President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors 
appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest 
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum 
for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of 
Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a 
choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President 
shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States. 
History: Proposed by Congress on De- ratified, by the legislatures ot three-fourths 
comber V2, 1803; declared to have been of the states ou September -f>; 1804. 
AMENDMENT XIII 
Section 1. 
Neither slaver} nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment 
for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist 
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction. 
Section 2. 
Congress shall have power <o enforce this article by appropriate legis-
lation. 
History: Proposed by Congress on Feb- lied by the legislatures of twenty-seven of 
ruarv 1, IS05; declared to have been rati- the thirty-six states on December IS, I860. 
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AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which 
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws. 
Section 2. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States accord-
ing to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons 
in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote 
at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President 
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and 
Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is 
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years 
of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except 
for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male 
citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years 
of age in such State. 
Section 3. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector 
of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken 
an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, 
or as a member of any State legislature or as an executive or judicial 
officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, 
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given 
aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-
thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section 4. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by 
law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for 
services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. 
But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt 
or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the 
United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; 
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Section 5. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, 
the provisions of this article. 
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781 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 
plinary process. The Rules presuppose that disciplin-
ary assessment of a lawyer's conduct will be made on 
the basis of the facts and circumstances as they ex-
isted at the time of the conduct in question and in 
recognition of the fact that a lawyer often has to act 
upon uncertain or incomplete evidence of the situa-
tion. Moreover, the Rules presuppose that whether or 
not discipline should be imposed for a violation and 
the severity of a sanction depend on all the circum-
stances, such as the willfulness and seriousness of the 
violation, extenuating factors and whether there 
have been previous violations. Disciplinary action 
shall be governed by the Procedures of Discipline of 
the Utah State Bar, and the burden of proof shall be 
on the State Bar to sustain any allegation of violation 
by clear and convincing evidence. 
Violation of a Rule should not give rise to a cause of 
action, nor should it create any presumption that a 
legal duty has been breached. The Rules are designed 
to provide guidance to lawyers and to provide a struc-
ture for regulating conduct through disciplinary 
agencies. They are not designed to be a basis for civil 
liability. Furthermore, the purpose of the Rules can 
be subverted when they are invoked by opposing par-
ties as procedural weapons. The fact that a Rule is a 
just basis for a lawyer's self-assessment or for sanc-
tioning a lawyer under the administration of a disci-
plinary authority does not imply that an antagonist 
in a collateral proceeding or transaction has standing 
to seek enforcement of the Rule. Accordingly, nothing 
in the Rule should be deemed to augment any sub-
stantive legal duty of lawyers or the extra-disciplin-
ary consequences of violating such a duty. 
Moreover, these Rules are not intended to govern 
or affect judicial application of either the client-law-
yer or work product privilege. Those privileges were 
developed to promote compliance with law and fair-
ness in litigation. In reliance on the client-lawyer 
privilege, clients are entitled to expect that communi-
cations within the scope of the privilege will be pro-
tected against compelled disclosure. The client-law-
yer privilege is that of the client and not of the law-
yer. The fact that in exceptional situations the lawyer 
under the Rules has a limited discretion to disclose a 
client confidence does not vitiate the proposition that, 
as a general matter, the client has a reasonable ex-
pectation that information relating to the client will 
not be voluntarily disclosed and that disclosure of 
such information may be judicially compelled only in 
accordance with the recognized exceptions to the cli-
ent-lawyer and work product privileges. 
The lawyer's exercise of discretion not to disclose 
information under Rule 1.6 should not be subject to 
reexamination. Permitting such reexamination 
would be incompatible with the general policy of pro-
moting compliance with law through assurances that 
communications will be protected against disclosure. 
The Comment accompanying each Rule explains 
and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule. 
The Preamble and this note on Scope provide general 
orientation. The Comments are intended as guides to 
interpretation, but the text of each Rule is authorita-
tive. Research notes were prepared to compare coun-
terparts in the Code of Professional Responsibility 
(approved by the Utah Supreme Court February 19. 
1971) and to provide selected references to other au-
thorities. The notes have not been adopted, do not 
constitute part of the Rules and are not intended to 
affect the application or interpretation of the Rules 
and Comments. 
TERMINOLOGY 
"Belief" or "believes" denotes that the person in-
volved actually supposed the fact in question to be 
true. A person's belief may be inferred from circum-
stances. 
"Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication 
of information reasonably sufficient to permit the cli-
ent to appreciate the significance of the matter in 
question. 
"Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in 
a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal depart-
ment of a corporation or other organization and law-
yers employed in a legal services organization. See 
Comment, Rule 1.10. 
"Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct having a 
purpose to deceive and not merely negligent misrep-
resentation or failure to apprise another of relevant 
information. 
"Knowingly," "known" or "knows" denotes actual 
knowledge of the fact in question. A person's knowl-
edge may be inferred from circumstances. 
"Partner" denotes a member of a partnership and a 
shareholder in a law firm organized as a professional 
corporation. 
"Reasonable" or "reasonably," when used in rela-
tion to conduct by a lawyer, denotes the conduct of a 
reasonably prudent and competent lawyer. 
"Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when 
used in reference to a lawyer denotes that the lawyer 
believes the matter in question and that the circum-
stances are such that the belief is reasonable. 
"Reasonably should know," when used in reference 
to a lawyer, denotes that a lawyer of reasonable pru-
dence and competence would ascertain the matter in 
question. 
"Substantial," when used in reference to degree or 
extent, denotes a material matter of clear and 
weighty importance. 
Cl ient-Lawyer Rela t ionship 
Rule 1.1. Competence . 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to 
a client. Competent representation requires the legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation rea-
sonably necessary for the representation. 
Rule 1.2. Scope of Representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions con-
cerning the objectives of representation, subject to 
paragraphs (b), (c), (d), and shall consult with the 
client as to the means by which they are to be pur-
sued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. 
In a criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's 
decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to a 
plea to be entered, whether to waive jury trial and 
whether the client will testify. 
(b) A lawyer may limit the objectives of the repre-
sentation if the client consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
assist a client, in conduct that the lawver knows is 
criminal or fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the 
legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct 
with a client and may counsel or assist a client to 
make a good faith effort to determine the validity, 
scope, meaning or application of the law. 
(d) When a lawyer knows that a client expects as-
sistance not permitted by the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law, the lawyer shall consult with 
the client regarding the relevant limitations on the 
lawyer's conduct. 
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Rule 1.3. Diligence. 
A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and 
promptness in representing a client. 
Rule 1.4. Communication. 
(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably in-
formed about the status of a matter and promptly 
comply with reasonable requests for information. 
(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation. 
Rule 1.5. Fees. 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, 
charge or coll?ct an illegal or clearly excessive fee. A 
fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the 
facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left 
with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in 
excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as 
guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee in-
clude the following: 
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty 
and difficulty of the questions involved and the 
skill requisite to perform the legal service prop-
erly; 
\2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, 
that the acceptance of the particular employment 
will preclude other employment by the lawyer: 
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality 
for similar legal services: 
(4) The amount involved and the results ob-
tained: 
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client 
or by the circumstances: 
(6) The nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client: 
(7) The experience, reputation and ability of 
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; 
and 
(81 Whether the fee is fixed or contingent. 
>b) When the lawyer has not regularly represented 
the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be commu-
nicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or 
within a reasonable time after commencing the repre-
sentation. 
(c) A fee may be contingent on the outcome of the 
matter for which the service is rendered, except in a 
matter in which a contingent fee is prohibited by 
paragraph (d) or other law. A contingent fee agree-
ment shall be in writing and shall state the method 
by which the fee is to be determined, including the 
percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the 
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, 
litigation and other expenses to be deducted from the 
recovery and whether such expenses are to be de-
ducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated. 
Upon conclusion of a contingent fee matter, the law-
yer shall provide the client with a written statement 
stating the outcome of the matter and. if there is a 
recovery, showing the remittance to the client and 
the method of its determination. 
td) A lawyer shall not enter into an arrangement 
foi, charge or collect: 
(1) Any fee in a domestic relations matter, the 
payment or amount of which is contingent upon 
the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of 
alimony or support, or property settlement in 
lieu thereof; or 
(2) A contingent fee for representing a defen-
dant in a criminal case. 
<e) A division of fee between lawyers who are not 
in the same firm may be made only if: 
(1) The division is in proportion to the services 
performed by each lawyer or, by written agree-
ment with the client, each lawyer assumes joint 
responsibility for the representation; 
(2) The client is advised of and does not object 
to the participation of all lawyers involved; and 
(3) The total fee is reasonable. 
Rule 1.6. Confidentiality of Information. 
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating 
to representation of a client except as stated in para-
graph (b), unless the client consents after disclosure. 
(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the 
extent the lawyer believes necessary: 
(1) To prevent the client from committing a 
criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer be-
lieves is likely to result in death or substantial 
bodily harm, or substantial injury to the finan-
cial interest or property of another; 
(2) To rectify the consequences of a client's 
criminal or fraudulent act in the commission of 
which the lawyer's services had been used; 
(3) To establish a claim or defense on behalf of 
the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer 
and the client or to establish a defense to a crimi-
nal charge or civil claim against the lawyer 
based upon conduct in which the client was in-
volved; or 
(4) To comply with the Rules of Professional 
Conduct or other law. 
(c) Representation of a client includes counseling a 
lawyens) about the need for or availability of treat-
ment for substance abuse or psychological or emo-
tional problems by members of the Utah State Bar 
serving on the Lawyers Helping Lawyers Committee. 
(Amended effective October 10, 1990.) 
Rule 1.7. Conflict of Interest: General Rule. 
(a) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the rep-
resentation of that client will be directly adverse to 
another client, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the repre-
sentation will not adversely affect the relation-
ship with the other client; and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the rep-
resentation of that client may be materially limited 
by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to 
a third person or by the lawyer's own interest, unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the repre-
sentation will not be adversely affected: and 
{2^ Each client consents after consultation. 
When representation of multiple clients in a sin-
gle matter is undertaken, the consultation shall 
include explanation to each client of the implica-
tions of the common representation and the ad-
vantages and risks involved. 
tc) A lawyer shall not simultaneously represent 
the interests of adverse parties in separate matters, 
unless: 
(1) The lawyer reasonably believes the repre-
sentation of each will not be adversely affected: 
and 
(2) Each client consents after consultation. 
Rule 1.8. Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Trans-
actions. 
(a) A lawyer shall not enter into a business trans-
action with a client or knowingly acquire an owner-
ship, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest 
adverse to a client unless: 
ll) The transaction and terms on which the 
lawyer acquires the interest are fair and reason-
39 
783 RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.11 
able to the client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing to the client in a manner 
which can be reasonably understood by the cli-
ent; and 
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportu-
nity to seek the advice of independent counsel in 
the transaction; and 
(3) The client consents in writing thereto. 
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to 
representation of a client to the disadvantage of the 
client unless the client consents after consultation. 
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giv-
ing the lawyer or a person related to the lawyer as 
parent, child, sibling or spouse any substantial gift 
from a client, including a testamentary gift, except 
where the client is related to the donee. 
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a 
client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agree-
ment giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a 
portrayal or an account based in substantial part on 
information relating to the representation. 
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance 
to a client in connection with pending or contem-
plated litigation, except: 
( D A lawyer may advance court costs and ex-
penses of litigation the repayment of which may 
be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and 
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client 
may pay court costs and expenses of litigation on 
behalf of the client. 
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for 
representing a client from one other than the client 
unless: 
(1) The client consents after consultation; 
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's 
independence of professional judgment or with 
the client-lawyer relationship; and 
(3) Information relating to representation of a 
client is protected as required by Rule 1.6. 
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients 
shall not participate in making an aggregate settle-
ment of the claims of or against the clients or in a 
criminal case an aggregated agreement as to guilty 
or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents 
after consultation, including disclosure of the exis-
tence and nature of all the claims or pleas involved 
and of the participation of each person in the settle-
ment. 
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospec-
tively limiting the lawyer's liability to a client for 
malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is 
independently represented in making the agreement 
or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepre-
sented client or former client without first advising 
that person in writing that independent representa-
tion is appropriate in connection therewith. 
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, 
child, sibling or spouse shall not represent a client in 
a representation directly adverse to a person who the 
lawyer knows is represented by the other lawyer ex-
cept upon consent by the client after consultation re-
garding the relationship. 
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary inter-
est in the cause of action or subject matter of litiga-
tion the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that 
the lawyer may: 
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the 
lawyer's fee or expenses; and 
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable con-
tingent fee in a civil case. 
Rule 1.9. Conflict of Interest: Former Client. 
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in 
a matter shall not thereafter: 
(a) Represent another person in the same or a 
substantially factually related matter in which 
that person's interests are materially adverse to 
the interests of the former client unless the for-
mer client consents after consultation; or 
(b) Use information relating to the representa-
tion to the disadvantage of the former client ex-
cept as Rule 1.6 would permit with respect to a 
client or when the information has become gener-
ally known. 
Rule 1.10. Imputed Disqualification: General 
Rule. 
(a) While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of 
them shall knowingly represent a client when any 
one of them practicing alone would be prohibited 
from doing so by Rule 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2. 
(b) When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, 
the firm may not knowingly represent a person in the 
same or a substantially factually related matter in 
which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer 
has associated, had previously represented a client 
whose interests are materially adverse to that person 
and about whom the lawyer had acquired information 
protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to 
the matter. 
(c) When a lawyer has terminated an association 
with a firm, the firm is not prohibited from thereafter 
representing a person with interests materially ad-
verse to those of a client represented by the formerly 
associated lawyer unless: 
(1) The matter is the same or substantially re-
lated to that in which the formerly associated 
lawyer represented the client; and 
(2) Any lawyer remaining in the firm has in-
formation protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that 
is material to the matter. 
(d) A disqualification prescribed by this Rule may 
be waived by the affected client under the conditions 
stated in Rule 1.7. 
Rule 1.11. Successive Government and Private 
Employment. 
(a) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, 
a lawyer shall not represent a private client in con-
nection with a matter in which the lawyer partici-
pated personally and substantially as a public officer 
or employee, unless the appropriate government 
agency consents after consultation. No lawyer in a 
firm with which that lawyer is associated may know-
ingly undertake or continue representation in such a 
matter unless: 
(1) The disqualified lawyer is screened from 
any participation in the matter and is appor-
tioned no part of the fee therefrom; and 
(2) Written notice is promptly given to the ap-
propriate government agency to enable it to as-
certain compliance with the provisions of this 
Rule. 
(b) Except as law may otherwise expressly permit, 
a lawyer having information that the lawyer knows 
is confidential government information about a per-
son acquired when the lawyer was a public officer or 
employee may not represent a private client whose 
interests are adverse to that person in a matter in 
which the information could be used to the material 
disadvantage of that person, unless the appropriate 
government client consents after consultation with 
the lawyer. A firm with which that lawyer is associ-
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